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Humor, the Law, and Judge Kozinski's 
Greatest   its* 
A couple of months ago a friend and I were discussing our 
law school experiences. Although we attend different law 
schools, our three year journeys have been surprisingly similar. 
For instance, we both thought it ironic that legal writing class- 
es attempt to teach students to write clearly and concisely 
while other law classes require students to  read cases that are 
neither clear nor concise.' We thought one of the best ways to  
learn good legal writing would have been to see good legal writ- 
* I know a snappy title is called for here, especially one containing a colon. 
Unfortunately every title I tried only muddied the theme of this Comment. 
Hopefully, there are enough quips in the body of the comment to compensate for 
the lack of snappiness in the title. For an example of a humorless note with a 
snappy title containing a colon, see David A. Golden, Note, The Ethics Reform Act 
of 1989: Why the Taxman Can't Be a Paperback Writer, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1025 
(proposing a constitutional paradigm for analyzing federal conflict of interest laws 
and concluding that the Taxman should indeed be allowed to be a Paperback 
Writer). While this citation appears self-serving, good form seems to require an 
author to cite his or her most recent publication within the first five footnotes of a 
new article. See, e.g, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 
78 VA. L. REV. , - n.2 1992 (forthcoming) (citing FREDERICK M. GEDICKS & 
ROGER H E N D ~  CHOOSING THE DREAM: THE FUTLJRE OF REUGION IN AMERICAN 
PUBLIC LIFE (Contributions to the Study of Religion No. 32, 1991)). Professor 
Gedicks is hardly alone in this practice. I single him out only because he has a 
good sense of humor. At any rate, it's too late now for him to change my grade in 
his class. 
** In a normal world, my name would go here. However, Law Review traditi- 
on forbids me from listing my name anywhere but at the end of this Comment 
(unless the listing is in conjunction with a citation to some previous work of mine. 
See, e.g., Golden, supra note *). Such rules, however, do not prevent me from 
expressing thanks to David Griner, Editor-in-Chief of the University of Georgia 
Law Review, for his comments on an earlier draR. Also, my thanks and apologies 
to Mrs. Karen Wakeford, my high school Latin teacher. See infra note 2. 
1. In fact, legal writing might be the only class where clear writing is actually 
rewarded. In most other classes writing quickJy is considerably more important 
than writing clearly. This is so because a law exam is usually a three-hour at- 
tempt to fill as many blue books as possible. As an illustration, my friend la- 
mented that his lowest grade in law school resulted from his failure to recopy § 1 
of the Sherman Anti-trust Act at the beginning of an open book exam. Instead he 
devoted his time to  analyzing issues far more complex than copying a statute 
word-for-word into a blue book. He learned his lesson. 
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ing more often. Instead, the cases we often encountered in 
casebooks were hardly the epitome of judicial clarity. 
Undoubtedly, it is not the design of law professors to pro- 
mote poor legal writing through their reading assignments. 
Professors merely use the cases tha t  are available. 
Unfortunately, few cases ever appear in a casebook in full form. 
They are always edited. The casebook editing process involves 
removing all or part of such boring details as the parties in the 
case, the underlying facts, the controlling law, the conclusion of 
the court, and the reasoning behind the court's decision. In 
fact, rarely a day goes by in law school that a student doesn't 
hear a comment from a professor somewhat along the lines oE 
'Well, it may not be apparent in the edited version of Marbury 
in your casebook, but the case actually concerned judicial re- 
view." 
In  addition to editing cases, casebook editors feel compelled 
to use as many hundred-year-old cases as possible. While I'm 
sure there are some brilliant hundred-year-old opinions in exis- 
tence, it seems that, as a whole, modern judges do a better job 
of being clear and c~nc i se .~  
Many judicial opinions are unclear because the judge in- 
tended to be unclear. Through ambiguity a judge is easily able 
to change his or her position on an  issue a t  a later date. It is 
easy to change your position if you never make the position 
clearly known. However, this does not help the law student in 
search of black letter law. 
Finally, many judicial opinions may be poorly written be- 
cause some judges are poor  writer^.^ I'm sure many judges 
would agree that there are a few in their ranks who are not 
good writers. Judges are in a very difficult position because so 
much of what they write is published. Thus, any shortcoming is 
in the public's plain view.4 
2. This may be because judges of the 1980s and 90s are not as prone to use 
Latin as judges of the 1880s and 90s. I t  is a firmly established legal maxim that 
one should always use a Latin word even when a perfectly good English word or 
phrase exists. Firmly established legal maxims are tough to ignore. See, e.g., 
habeas corpus (to have a body), sui juris (old enough to sue a juror), nolo contende- 
re (I did it, but I don't want to argue about it), in personam (in person-as in "I 
saw Elvis in personam."), in foma pauperis (to look poor-as 'Greg must be 
down on his luck, the bank just. foreclosed on his house and now he is in forma 
pauperis."). 
3. Maybe these judges were very fast writers in law school. See supra note 1. 
4. As if this isn't bad enough, judicial opinions, especially Supreme Court 
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Because of the daunting upstream swim a clear judicial 
opinion faces en route to law students, it is always a pleasant 
surprise to read an opinion in a casebook that is memorable for 
its writing style as well as for its substance. One writing style 
that is consistently memorable is one that uses humor.5 This 
Comment advocates the use of humor in judicial opinions in the 
hope that  more such opinions will find their way into 
casebooks. Of course, not everyone shares my view. 
11. HUMOR AND THE CRITICS 
This Comment is not intended to be an exhaustive rebuttal 
of the criticisms of judicial humor.6 Such an  attempt would be 
futile since the loudest critics of judicial humor are most likely 
Humor Impaired.' Accordingly, it would be impossible to con- 
vince such critics of the value of something that they do not 
see. However, I will take a brief look at the arguments against 
judicial humor using a note that  typifies the traditional attack.' 
opinions, are a prime target for every know-it-all law review member to use in 
crafting his or her student note. In a student note, a law student, with a whole 
nine months of law school under his or her belt, selects a judicial opinion and 
then proceeds to show how the judges who actually read the briefs and heard the 
oral arguments in the case completely botched the issue. The student then illus- 
trates the "proper" mode of analyzing the issue. The student's argument, interest- 
ingly enough, usually sounds strikingly similar to the dissenting opinion in the 
case. 
5. My proposition is that humor makes things more memorable. In support, I 
cite a personal experience: When I was in the eighth grade, I took a required 
Georgia History course. The only thing I remember from the class is an assign- 
ment that required each member to write a poem about a Georgia river. My friend 
Walter did not remember the assignment until the due date. When it was his 
turn, he presented the following poem: 
Men Work Hard 
Hauling Pig Lard 
Up and Down 
To and Fro 
On the Savannah 
I got an A on my poem, Walter got a D. It should have been the other way 
around. Walter's poem remains one of my favorites. I remember nothing about my 
poem. In fact, I can't even remember my river. 
6. I'll just take a few cheap shots and move on. 
7. For a more detailed explanation of humor impairment and some of the 
technology available to the Humor Impaired, see Dave Barry, Finally! Help for the 
Humor Impaired, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 1989, at 51. (Barry describes shorts 
equipped with radio-controlled electrodes to be worn by the Humor Impaired so 
that those with a sense of humor can signal them, via electric shocks, when to 
laugh. Barry also includes an example of a humorous article closed-captioned for 
the Humor Impaired). 
8. Marshall Rudolph, Note, Judicial Humor: A Laughing Matter?, 41 H A ~ I N G S  
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A. The Poor Loser 
The typical attack on judicial humor characterizes the of- 
fending judge as a Machiavellian, insensitive lout who enjoys 
abusing the d~wntrodden.~ These critics feel that parties to 
litigation become sacrosanct by stepping onto the courtroom 
floor. No matter how egregious or foolish a litigant's conduct 
becomes, according to critics, judges should be powerless to  
address the absurdity of such conduct in an opinion since point- 
ing out such conduct may obviously be embarrassing to the 
litigant.'' However, instead of allowing a judge to vent a little 
annoyance with a quip or two in an opinion, perhaps the losing 
party would prefer that the judge grant the opposing party's 
Rule 11 motion. 
Relying on the losing party's opinion of judicial humor is 
somewhat suspect. Rather than resenting the humor, the losing 
party may be in a bad mood because it lost. Consequently, the 
losing party is not going to like anything the judge has to say, 
humorous or otherwise, unless it reinforces or vindicates its 
position." On the other hand, the winning party probably 
couldn't care less about the humor in an opinion. 
Finally, how many litigants even read the final opinion? 
After all, judicial opinions are really not written for the parties 
so much as for posterity. If the present litigation was the only 
concern, a simple thumbs down from the judge would let the 
plaintiff know that he or she lost. 
B. The Public Doesn't Want It 
One critic argued such television shows as LA. Law and 
Perry Mason "depict humor only outside the courtroom" and 
thus "our society expects a very high degree of seriousness from 
L.J. 175 (1989) (note the snappy title and the colon). 
9. "People should enjoy a good laugh, but not in the traumatic and expensive 
context of litigation." Id. at 179. "However amusing someone else's dispute may be, 
it is anything but funny to have one's own right to property, liberty, or good 
reputation determined by a judge . . . . * Id. 
10. "The ultimate propriety of judicial humor really depends on its effect. A 
judicial humorist may not intend to ridicule litigants, but if the humor has that ef- 
fed, then intent is irrelevant." Id. (emphasis in original). 
11. Has anyone ever noticed that no one asks the losing quarterback after a 
Super Bowl what his plans are? 
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its j~diciary."'~ Accordingly, the critic believes that this illus- 
trates the public's agreement with his assessment of judicial 
humor as "an enfant terrible that, like any undisciplined child, 
amuses its inordinately tolerant judicial 'parents' a t  the ex- 
pense and dismay of the rest of s~ciety."'~ It is remarkable to 
think that one can ascertain the public's expectation of law 
from the Perry Mason series-a show in which the prosecutor, 
Hamilton Burger, is the legal equivalent of the Washington 
Generals.14 This is much the same as assuming that the 
public's expectation of the law of contracts may be derived from 
The Little Mermaid .15 
12. Rudolph, supra note 8, at 179 (emphasis in original). 
13. Id. at 178. 
14. Those unfamiliar with the Washington Generals, should look under the 
topic of "Losingest Basketball Teamn in the Guiness Book of World Records. Like 
Burger, the Generals have the same opponent night aRer night-the Harlem Globe 
Trotters. For additional commentary on the "realism" of the Perry Mason series, 
see James D. Gordon 111, Humor in Legal Education and Scholarship, 1992 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 313, 318 11.35. 
Of course the commentator did state that "the reader will notice a fair amount 
of humor in this Note." Rudolph, supra note 8, a t  179 11.22. Maybe buttressing his 
argument with Perry Mason reruns is one example. Somehow I doubt it. See supra 
note 7 and accompanying text. 
15. For those unfamiliar with this Disney classic, the story centers around a 
contract between the Little Mermaid (Ariel) and the Sea Witch (Ursula). Ariel and 
Ursula entered into a contract (Contract) in which Ursula was to give Ariel a pair 
of legs in exchange for Ariel's voice. However, Ariel would become the possession of 
Ursula if the Prince, the object of Ariel's desire, did not kiss Ariel within three 
days of the signing of the Contract. Early in the three-day period, things looked 
positive for Ariel. However, as the Prince was poised to kiss Ariel, Ursula disrupt- 
ed Ariel's connubial quest by tipping over their rowboat. After this close call, 
Ursula changed into a woman and used Ariel's voice to capture the Prince's affec- 
tions long enough for the three-day period to expire. As Ursula proceeded to  take 
Ariel, King Triton, Ariel's father, flung a lightening bolt at Ursula to prevent 
enforcement of the Contract. Using the Contract as a shield, Ursula deflected 
Triton's lightning bolt, exclaiming, "You see, the Contract is legal, binding, and 
completely unbreakable, even for you." Under the Perry MmonlLA. Law Public 
Expectation Theory, society would applaud the enforcement of the Contract against 
Ariel since in the movie the Contract was indeed binding. 
Although Ursula did not live long enough to see the appeal, in a suit brought 
by her estate against Ariel for breach of contract, the appellate court rejeded the 
"lightning bolt test." Instead the court of appeals concluded that the Contract was 
voidable by the minor Ariel, that Ursula breache'd her implied good faith promise 
not to interfere with Ariel's performance, and that the Contract was void as being 
contrary to public policy. We can conclude that even though it correctly reflects the 
law, this outcome is contrary to public expectation since this part of the story 
never made it into the movie. 
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C. Amend the Code? Huh? 
In the most amusing part of his criticism, one commentator 
actually suggested amending the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct 
to ban humor in opinions.16 This new provision would read: 
The use of humor in a judicial opinion is inappropriate if: 
(A) a reasonable litigant would feel that he or she had been 
made the subject of amusement, or 
(B) opinion utility would be compromised by the humor." 
The commentator goes on to state that "the actual meaning 
of 'opinion utility' is intentionally vague so that local jurisdic- 
tions will have discretion to impose their own notions of judi- 
cial decorum on an  ad hoc basis."lg 
This is great! We endow our judges with power to adju- 
dicate disputes involving life, liberty, and property. But we stop 
right there! We will tolerate no wit in an opinion. We cannot 
trust judges to use their discretion in anything so life and 
death as humor. And we will have absolutely no "compromised 
opinion utility" (whatever that is). We have standards! 
Whether a judge violates this proposed judicial code would 
be determined by a "reviewing commi~sion."'~ I can just see 
this panel at work: 
CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, when the judge called the defendant 
a clown she was holding the poor guy up t o  ridicule. I'm going 
to have to vote to disbar the judge. 
COMMISSION MEMBER: What? The defendant is a clown. He 
had on a big rubber nose, oversized shoes, and a red wig 
when he robbed the bank. The defendant was holding himself 
up to ridicule. The judge was just noting the facts; it's her job. 
CHAIRPERSON: There you go ridiculing this poor criminal. I'll 
tolerate none of your levity. I'll see that you're disbarred." 
To be sure, I am not advocating the placing of "kick me" 
signs on litigants' backs as they come into the courtroom. While 
16. I AM NOT MAKING THIS UP. See Rudolph, supra note 8, at 195. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 197. 
20. Perhaps the panel could adopt a "grin test." That is, if a reasonable person 
is compelled to smile broadly enough to reveal six or more front teeth, the opinion 
is inappropriately humorous. 
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this may be funny to some, it  is obviously inappropriate. What 
I am arguing is that the proposed amendment is no improve- 
ment. I assert that unless a judge's conduct violates Canon 3 of 
the ABA Code of Judicial Cond~ct:~ no further inquiry into a 
judge's actions or opinions is warranted. 
Instead of ascertaining the public's approval of judicial 
humor from Perry Mason reruns, a better alternative might be 
to look a t  actual examples of effective judicial humor and let 
the public decide for itself. This Comment attempts to do just 
that. To do this, I have focused on the writings of Judge Alex 
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
I picked Judge Kozinski for a reason: Although he has been 
on the bench only a few years, he's had quite an  impact on the 
legal community, in no small part because people actually read 
his opinions. Readers of Judge Kozinski's work are not limited 
to the people who have to read it-the parties in  the case, law 
geeks, first year law review members trawling for a casenote 
topic etc.-but a lot of other people who have an appreciation 
for a pithy legal argument or a well-turned phrase. As one 
legal scholar recently noted, 'The Kozinski paper trail is exten- 
sive. It is also laced with humor. But never is the humor unre- 
lated to the issues raised."22 Judge Kozinski combines humor 
with a direct, uncluttered writing style to make his points 
clearly and convincingly. He proceeds from the philosophy that 
it's not enough to be right; a judge must also be read and re- 
membered to have an impact. 
Judicial opinions like Judge Kozinski's are one cure for the 
dreary casebooks I complained about earlier. In  fact, through 
case book^,^^ classroom handouts and word of mouth, Judge 
Kozinski's opinions have begun to make their way into the law 
schools-another way to make an impact. Countless law stu- 
dents across the country are discovering that  there is, after all, 
life in the law upon reading Judge Kozinski's ode to the parole 
21. "A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants . . . ." 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3-A(3) (1984). 
22. Norman Karlin, It's a Judge's Duty to Stir up Controversy on Legal Issues, 
L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 24, 1991, at 7. 
23. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT 
LAW 528, 786, 1052 (1991); JOHN D. CALAMARI, JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN 
HADJNANNAKIS BENDER, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 294 (2d ed. 1989). 
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evidence rule in the case of the greedy law or his 
Cloud Cuckooland opinion, in which he criticizes-with all the 
subtlety of a jihad-the newfangled tort of maliciously refusing 
to admit you have a contract.25 
However, classifying Judge Kozinski merely as a humorous 
jurist would be a gross mischaracterization. A judicial opinion 
designed solely to invoke a laugh would be as substantively 
deficient as a poem about pig lard.26 Although the opinion 
would be memorable, it would have no impact on the law. Even 
though the typical Kozinski opinion contains lines that will 
make the reader laugh out loud, the opinion is always 
grounded in legal substance, not on jokes.27 In fact, while 
Judge Kozinski is adept at making people laugh, his real talent 
lies in making enigmatic points of law clear and quotable. To 
illustrate this point, I have excerpted more than just those 
Kozinski quotes that are outrageously humorous. I have also 
included a number of quotes that subtly use wit or satire to  
articulate complex points of law. 
With this in mind, please read the following excerpts 
(which are organized topically for easy reference), at your con- 
venience. Additionally, you might ask yourself this question: 
Am I a bright, with-it kind of person with a superior wit and 
intellect who enjoys this type of clear, cogent writing in judicial 
opinions (i.e., did I laugh at any of the quotes) or am I a dull- 
ard (i.e., do I think that Judge Kozinski needs to go back to 
school to  learn some of those long words and Latin phrases 
that are conspicuously absent from his opinions)? Finally, when 
you finish reading the quotes, please fill out the survey at the 
end so that we can scientificallyz8 ascertain the public's true 
opinion of judicial humor. 
24. See infra text accompanying note 86. 
25. See infra text accompanying note 51. Law professors, too, seem to like his 
opinions-if only to explain how patently wrong they are. 
26. See supm note 5. Although I like the poem, I admit it is a bit lacking in 
substance. 
27. In short, the type of legal writing the Humor Impaired hate with a 
passion-or rather would hate with a passion if they could only recognize humor 
and if they had a passion with which to hate it. 
28. I.e., without using Perry Mason. 
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A. Great One Liners 
In law, as in life, two wrongs add up to two wrongs, nothing 
more.29 
Saying the same thing twice gives it no more weight?' 
But courts do not sit t o  compensate the luckless; this is not 
Sherwood F~res t .~ '  
In my view, this is a poor bargain. We will come to grief as a 
nation if we continue the current trend of robbing Peter to  
pay Paul's lawyer.32 
It's not easy to describe the many ways in which the panel's 
opinion conflicts with those of every other federal court t o  
have applied section 924(c), but I will try.33 
Personal initiative, not government control, is the fountain- 
head of progress in a capitalist economy.34 
If, as the metaphor goes, a market economy is governed by an 
invisible hand, competition is surely the brass knuckles by 
which it enforces its decisions.35 
There is not much one can really say about this line of rea- 
soning, except that it will persuade only those who are al- 
ready persuaded.36 
29. Cubanski v. Heckler, 794 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., dis- 
senting from denial of rehearing en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. Bowen v. 
Kizer, 485 U.S. 386 (1988)). 
30. Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 852 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring). 
31. Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 798 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
32. United States v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 895 F.2d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting in part). 
33. United States v. Phelps, 8g5 F.2d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
34. United States v. Syufjr Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 673 (9th Cir. 1990). 
35. Id. at 663. 
36. United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 769 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting in part). 
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The fundamental premise of laches is that those who sleep on 
their rights surrender them; if you snooze, you lose.37 
. . . AIG's lawyers sat around contemplating their navels for 
two and one half years while the Bank was struggling to 
build up its good will.38 
Every market has its dreamers and its crooks. Occasionally, 
they are one and the same." 
The rational basis test is, more or less, a judicial rubber 
stamp. " 
Precedent joins common sensee4' 
But, a s  this case shows, a crafty lawyer can piece together a 
series of irrelevancies into a mosaic that juries and judges 
will find compelling." 
Gone are the days when a movie ticket cost a dime, popcorn a 
nickel and theaters had a single screen: This is the age of the 
multiplex." 
We answer unequivocally: yes and no." 
Mules seldom have a viable defense, generally having been 
corralled red-hoofed with large quantities of illegal drugs a t  
or near the border.45 
Wise or not, a deal is a deal? 
37. American Intl  Group v. American Int'l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 
199 1) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
38. Id. at  838. 
39. In re Brentwood Sec., Inc., 925 F.2d 325, 330 (9th Cir. 1991). 
40. United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1201 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990). 
41. Grunwald v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1223, 1230 
(9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
42. Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 786 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
43. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1990). 
44. United States v. Redondo-Lemos, No. 90-10430, slip op. 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
45. Id. at  1154. 
46. United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 806 
F.2d 1385, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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Moviemakers do lunch, not contracts.47 
The Mellons partook of piscine fare; Mr. Mellon had the mahi- 
mahi, Mrs. Mellon the shrimp.48 
In this case we must balance the rights of one individual 
against those of another, and individual rights against the 
workings of our criminal justice system." 
In the marketplace of ideas, [falsifying quotations] gives the 
author an unjustified monopoly.50 
B. On Wasteful Litigation 
Discussing the California tort of bad-faith denial of the exis- 
tence of a contract: 
Nowhere but in the Cloud Cuckooland of modern tort 
theory could a case like this have been concocted. One large 
corporation is complaining that another obstinately refused t o  
acknowledge they had a contract. For this shocking miscon- 
duct it is demanding millions of dollars in punitive damages. 
I suppose we will next be seeing lawsuits seeking punitive 
damages for maliciously refusing to return telephone calls or 
adopting a condescending tone in inter-office memos. Not 
every slight, nor even every wrong, ought to have a tort reme- 
dy. The intrusion of courts into every aspect of life, and par- 
ticularly into every type of business relationship, generates 
serious costs and uncertainties, trivializes the law, and denies 
individuals and businesses the autonomy of adjusting mutual 
rights and responsibilities through voluntary contractual 
agreement. 
In inventing the tort of bad faith denial of a contract, 
Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 
Cal.3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal.Rptr. 354 (1984), the Cali- 
fornia Supreme Court has created a cause of action so nebu- 
lous in outline and so unpredictable in application that it 
more resembles a brick thrown from a third story window 
47. Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556 (9th Cir. 1990). 
48. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 901 F.2d 765, 766 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
49. United States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 403 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
50. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1470 n.9 (9th Cir. 
1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 111 S.Ct. 2419 (1991). 
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than a rule of law. 
. . . .  
Seaman's throws kerosene on the litigation bonfire by 
holding out the allure of punitive damages, a golden carrot 
that entices into court parties who might otherwise be in- 
clined to resolve their differences . . . . 
This tortification of contract law-the tendency of con- 
tract disputes to metastasize into torts--gives rise to a new 
form of entrepreneurship: investment in tort causes of action. 
"If Pennzoil won $11 billion from Texaco, why not me?" That 
thought must cross the minds of many enterprising lawyers 
and businessmen. A claim such as  "defined by Seaman's is a 
particularly attractive investment vehicle: The potential re- 
wards are large, the rules nebulous, and the parties uncon- 
strained by such annoying technicalities as the language of 
the contract to which they once agreed.51 
The eagerness of judges to expand the horizons of tort liabili- 
ty is symptomatic of a more insidious disease: the novel belief 
that any problem can be ameliorated if only a court gets in- 
volved. Not so. Courts are slow, clumsy, heavy-handed institu- 
tions, ill-suited to oversee the negotiations between corpora- 
tions, to determine what compromises a manufacturer and a 
retailer should make in closing a mutually profitable deal, or 
to evaluate whether an export-import consortium is develop- 
ing new markets in accordance with the standards of the 
business community. 
Moreover, because litigation is costly, time consuming 
and risky, judicial meddling in many business deals imposes 
onerous burdens. It  wasn't so long ago that being sued (or 
suing) was an unthinkable event for many small and medi- 
um-sized businesses. Today, legal expenses are a standard 
and often uncontrollable item in every business's budget, 
diverting resources from more productive areas of entrepre- 
neurship. Nor can commercial enterprises be expected to  
flourish in a legal atmosphere where every move, every inno- 
vation, every business decision must be hedged against the 
risk of exotic new causes of action and incalculable damag- 
e ~ . ~ ~  
51. Oki America, Inc. v. Microtech Intl, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 314-15 (9th Cir. 
1989) (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
52. Id. at 316 (citation omitted). 
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Considering an appeal from a n  award of attorneys' fees: 
This is a case of litigation run amok. A minor dispute 
that long ago should have been resolved by the parties with- 
out the help of lawyers has been transformed into an attor- 
ney-feegenerating machine." 
Yet, as anyone who has dealt with the law knows only too 
well, a $6000 claim is hardly worth litigating; it often costs 
more than that t o  hire a lawyer just to file a complaint. As 
here, the solution often adopted is to pile on a lot of big-ticket 
claims. 
. . . By the time they were finished, they were asking for 
more than $1 million, an amount more nearly worth fighting 
for.54 
Lawsuits have become particularly inappropriate devices for 
resolving minor disputes. They are clumsy, noisy, unwieldy 
and notoriously inefficient. Fueled by bad feelings, they gen- 
erate much heat and friction, yet produce little that is of any 
use. Worst of all, once set in motion, they are well-nigh im- 
possible to bring to a 
Dissenting in a case affirming a jury verdict in favor of an 
employee who had been laid oft 
But lawyers can only give clients reliable advice to the extent 
courts in fact do as they say. When courts overlook, stretch, 
riddle ~ t h  exceptions or ignore legal principles, prediction 
becomes difficult. Indeed, it is a commonplace among lawyers 
that even a fool-proof case can be lost once i t  gets into 
Here the plaintiff dragged Levolor into court and presented 
nothing more than unsubstantiated assertions that there was 
an implied contract of employment. . . . What earthly good 
then is the statutory presu~nption?~' 
53. Blackburn v. Goettel-Blanton, 898 F.2d 95, 96 (9th Cir. 1990). 
54. Id. at 97. 
55. Id. at 99. 
56. Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
57. Id. at 782. 
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But are we potted plants? If we're going to affirm the district 
court when its actions are plainly contrary to the facts and 
the law, why bother with appellate review? 
Admittedly, this is not a very important case; it is a 
garden variety employment dispute, much like thousands of 
others litigated in the courts every year. The verdict, 
$137,000, is hardly astronomical by current standards, and 
the plaintiff, Ada Kern, surely needs the money much more 
than the defendant, a large, multi-state corporation. But the 
simple fact remains that, when the law is fairly applied to the 
record, Levolor is entitled to keep the money. We have a re- 
sponsibility to so hold." 
Searching for the existence, and divining the terms, of an 
implied contract is a burdensome, time-consuming and uncer- 
tain proposition. The risk of an erroneous determination is 
greatly magnified, encouraging parties with weak 
positions-employers as well as employees-to spin the litiga- 
tion wheel-of-fortune. Rational planning or a reasonable liti- 
gation strategy becomes very difficult as no one can tell even 
remotely how a case will be resolved once i t  gets into court. 
The ability to predict outcomes, which lay a t  the heart of 
Justice Holmes's model of the legal profession, is lost as  a 
vocation; the lawyer ceases to be a forecaster and becomes a 
croupier .5g 
What we have here is a cheap litigation trick, honed to a fine 
ar t  by contingency-fee-hungry lawyers: rummage through the 
opposing party's files and records until you find something 
that looks vaguely like your client has been afforded differen- 
tial treatment, no matter how trivial or irrelevant, and then 
parade it before the jury as a grave injustice." 
But, as this case shows, a crafly lawyer can piece together a 
series of irrelevancies into a mosaic that juries and judges 
will find ~ompelling.~' 
To say, as the majority does, that a rational jury might find 
that Ada' Kern had a contractual right to have Levolor per- 
form an irrelevant, hypothetical and to her unknown tabula- 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 783. 
60. Id. at 786. 
61. Id. at 786 n.6. 
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tion on the layoff tally sheet, is so contrary to common sense 
i t  does not, in my opinion, pass the snicker test. Quite aside 
from the substantive problems with today's opinion, one un- 
fortunate consequence is that lawyers will be encouraged to 
engage in this type of scorched-earth litigation tactic; after 
all, you never know what triviality might impress a court and 
jury. This is no doubt welcome news for lawyers, but I doubt 
i t  helps the economy or that it is in the long-term interest of 
employees." 
The only relevant evidence here demonstrates that, had 
Levolor done every little thing Ada Kern claims it should 
have, she would still have been laid off. Where, then, is her 
beef? 
. . . .  
The boiling point of water is the same whether expressed 
as 212" Fahrenheit, 100' Celsius or 373" Kelvin. Applying a 
mechanical formula for converting Ada Kern's performance 
ratings into golf scores cannot affect her relative position in 
the layoff queue vis-a-vis other employees; the fact remains, 
she was still the least productive and most junior of the three 
wand maker^.^^ 
I wonder if the rule also works the other way: when a court 
neglects to include damages to which a plaintiff is legally 
entitled, does the plaintiff have to eat the difference as  long 
as  the judge or jury might have awarded the lesser amount 
on a proper theory?64 
Commenting on a lawsuit over the interest on an $8 monthly 
union fee, Judge Kozinski wrote: 
It  is over such a trifle-such a bagatelle, as the French would 
call i t i t h a t  this lawsuit is brought, with all the attendant 
costs and burdens of modern litigation. At bottom, this is a 
protest action by certain teachers against a union to which 
they do not belong but to which they are forced to contribute 
financially. Their frustration is understandable, but they have 
62. Id. at 786. 
63. Id. at 788. 
64. Id. at 795 (footnote omitted). 
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chosen the wrong forum for resolving what 
political dispute.65 
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is essentially a 
I do see, however, a different kind of tyranny in this 
case-the tyranny of the modern lawsuit. In a dispute over 
interests that are, in my judgement, adequately served and in 
any event minuscule, the plaintiffs have managed to impose 
on the defendants very substantial litigation costs. Win, lose 
or draw, the union will have spent a substantial chunk of the 
funds collected and earmarked for representation. Moreover, 
the majority's ruling will impose on the union a burden vastly 
out of proportion to any benefits plaintiffs may gain by get- 
ting their $8 a month starting in September rather than De- 
cember. 
We do the judicial system, and the society it serves, seri- 
ous harm when we countenance such bagatelle l i t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
C. Judicial Rulemaking 
Lamenting the failure of appellate courts to  craft clear rules of 
law: 
The majority may believe that it has reached a ~olomonic 
solution, but, like Solomon, they may have merely reached a 
result that satisfies the court's own sense of equity without 
genuine regard for whether its ruling makes ~ense .~ '  
Solomon's own reputation as a man of justice is probably 
overrated. His resolution of the famed maternity dispute rests 
on the presumption that the baby's biological mother would 
be concerned about the life of the baby while the other woman 
would readily consent to its slaughter. Does this really make 
sense? As the story goes, the false mother was so grieved by 
the loss of her own baby that she stole that of another. 1 
Kings 3:16-28. Would a woman in that situation countenance 
with indifference the killing of the very infant she had stolen 
to assuage her grief? In lieu of engaging in careful fact find- 
ing, Solomon may simply have handed the baby over to the 
65. Grunwald v. San Bernardino Unified Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1223, 1230 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting in part). 
66. Id. at 1232-33. 
67. United States v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 895 F.2d 546, 555 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). 
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woman who was clever enough to see through his bluff.68 
All of which is to say that Solomonic solutions may satisfy the 
Solomon in each of us, but do not necessarily reach the cor- 
rect result. If Solomon's experience teaches anything, i t  is 
that courts must be extremely wary of adopting rules of law 
that satisfy the court's sense of justice but fail to take into 
account the realities of the dispute before them?' 
Like every other court that adopts a broad and complicated 
rule, the majority predicts only modest consequences because 
of the "unique circumstances" of this case. But there is noth- 
ing unique about this case; it's a run-of-the-Miller Act dis- 
pute. I doubt that the majority's disclaimer will deter many 
lawyers from pushing the majority's maverick rule to the 
limits of its logic.70 
On the relationship between trial and appellate courts: 
Appellate judges are fond of inventing formulas, tests and 
rules to constrain trial courts. Unable to participate in trial 
litigation directly, they gaze upon it with suspicion from a 
distance-a height, some would insist. The realities of the 
courtroom-the dozens of details that a district judge is able 
to absorb, assimilate and consider-escape appellate scrutiny 
simply because the reporter can capture only the words spo- 
ken, not the inflection with which they are delivered or the 
look (or absence thereof) that may accompany them. Con- 
signed to watching the courtroom's dramas flicker by like 
shadows on a cave wall, appellate judges are wont to seek 
clarity by forcing the actors to take exaggerated, stylized 
steps that leave images sufficiently distinctive to be examined 
and reviewed on a cold record. 
This faith in procedural choreography is, in my view, 
fundamentally flawed. Appellate courts cannot foresee all con- 
tingencies; they cannot reduce every conceivable factor to a 
neat formula, nor anticipate every factual nuance a district 
judge might grasp by being there, able to hear, speak and 
observe. Nor can procedural incantations fulfill the lofiy aspi- 
rations appellate judges have for them. A colloquy conducted 
68. Id. at 555 n.5. 
69. Id. at 555. 
70. Id. (citation omitted). 
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in a rote and mechanical fashion, like a Miranda warning 
given in a disinterested tone, may look reassuring on the 
record but will do little to protect the rights of the accused. 
And, ritual has its costs; it is inflexible by nature and may as 
often defeat the ends it is designed to  advance as serve them. 
Appellate judges should be aware of their limitations. 
They can guide and review, but they cannot run the show. 
The task of safeguarding the rights of criminal defendants 
ultimately rests with the experienced men and women who 
preside in our district courts. We should let them do their 
jobs.?' 
There is no meaningful difference between saying that the 
government is equitably estopped from raising the statutory 
cutoff date and disregarding the cutoff date as a matter of 
equity. The panel substitutes words for concepts. 
. . . .  
All of that having been said, one might nevertheless be 
inclined t o  overlook the panel's errors. The result it reaches is 
appealing; the fact situation is somewhat unusual; the precise 
issue may never arise again. There is a strong temptation, 
therefore, to treat the decision as a sport, unworthy of further 
thought or concern. 
. . . These issues, tucked away almost as an afterthought 
in the panel's conclusion, promise to be the opinion's most 
troublesome aspect, far transcending the case of these Filipino 
war veterans. What the panel has done goes to the very heart 
of our jurisprudence and will sow no end of mischief if fol- 
lowed as pre~edent.?~ 
The question of whether the court is right in invoking its 
equity powers turns out to  be important because of the liber- 
ties the panel takes once it deems itself freed from the con- 
straints of a court sitting at law. If equity can do all that the 
panel here says i t  can, courts must surely be far more cau- 
tious in asserting its authority." 
71. United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1491 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring). 
72. Pangilinan v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 809 F.2d 1449, 1452 
(9th Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), rev'd, 
486 U.S. 875 (1988). 
73. Id. at 1453 (citation omitted). 
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If Fedorenko can be distinguished, the panel fails to do so, 
apparently relying on its equity powers to shrug off a categor- 
ical directive from the Supreme Court. But it does not, in my 
view, serve the orderly development of law in this circuit to 
deny apparently controlling Supreme Court authority so much 
as a nod of acknowledgement. 
[Tlhe panel trips lightly over the question of how a court, 
whether sitting in law or equity, can breathe life into a stat- 
ute 40 years dead.74 
D. Puns 
On construing the State of Virginia's law of contracts: 
The answer to the question presented in this appeal is, yes, 
Virginia, there is a par01 evidence rule.75 
The facts that spawned this controversy are relatively 
straightforward. Defendants Alexander and Peele are Haida 
Indians. Peele harvested over half a ton of herring roe on kelp 
in Southeastern Alaska and enlisted Alexander's help in sell- 
ing it. However, they had permits for only 444 pounds. Unde- 
terred, they loaded an old Dodge station wagon to the gills 
with the contraband and trawled Canada for a buyer. Their 
plan began to flounder when they were unable to hook a buy- 
er and the herring roe began to rot. They then attempted to 
enter the United States, hoping to unload their now malodor- 
ous cargo in the state of Washington. Alerted by Canadian 
officials, United States Customs agents snared the purloiners 
of prenatal pisces. Defendants were charged with violating 
the Lacey Act, which makes i t  illegal to transport in inter- 
state or foreign commerce any fish or wildlife taken or sold in 
violation of state law. 16 U.S.C. $ 3372(a)(Z)(A). The jury con- 
victed and defendants appeal.76 
74. Id. at 1454. 
75. Wilson Arlington Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 366, 367 (9th Cir. 
1990) (construing Virginia Law). 
76. United States v. Alexander, 938 F.2d 942, 944-45 (9th Cir. 1991) (footnote 
omitted). 
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Suspect that giant film distributors like Columbia, Para- 
mount and Twentieth Century-Fox had fallen prey to Ray- 
mond Syufy, the canny operator of a chain of Las Vegas, Ne- 
vada, movie theaters, the United States Department of Jus- 
tice brought this civil antitrust action to force Syufy to dis- 
gorge the theaters he had purchased in 1982-84 from his 
former competitors. . . . The Justice Department nevertheless 
remains intent on rescuing this platoon of Goliaths from a 
single David.77 
E. Ethics of Journalism 
Truth is a journalist's stock in trade. To invoke the right to 
deliberately distort what someone else has said is to assert 
the right to lie in print. To have that assertion made by The 
New Yorker, widely acknowledged as the flagship publication 
when i t  comes to truth and accuracy, debases the journalistic 
profession as a whole. Whatever it might have taken to refute 
Masson's allegations on the merits is not, in my view, worth 
the unsettling implications left by defeating him on these 
grounds. Masson has lost his case, but the defendants, and 
the profession to which they belong, have lost far more." 
Unlike my colleagues, I am unable to construe the first 
amendment as granting journalists a privilege to engage in 
practices they themselves frown upon, practices one of our 
defendants has flatly disowned as journalistic heresy. The 
press can legitimately claim the right to editorial judgment 
when it is selecting the words itself; it cannot, and does not, 
claim the right to select words for others." 
F. On Contracts 
Judge Kozinski actually believes contracts mean what they say, 
and say what they mean: 
Once again, we consider whether a contract is an instrument 
77. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1990). For the 
official listing of all 215 movie titles in Syufy, see The Syufy Rosetta Stone, 1992 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 457. 
78. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1486 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 111 S.Ct. 2419 (1991). 
79. Id. at 1478 (citation omitted). 
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by which parties can define their rights and responsibilities 
by mutual agreement, or a platform for judicial 
poli~ymaking.~~ 
To recite such reasoning is to criticize it. The idea that a 
party may not rely on a contract term because the other side 
can be expected t o  violate it cuts a t  the very heart of contract 
law. Contracts enable parties to define their mutual rights 
and responsibilities; they are usefhl only insofar as each side 
can count on being able to hold the other to the terms of the 
agreement. If a contract provides anything a t  all, then, it is 
the reasonable expectation the that parties will fulfill their 
obligations, either voluntarily or under judicial compulsion. 
For a court to deny enforcement of a contract term because 
breach is foreseeable defeats the purpose of having a contract, 
effectively withdrawing that particular issue from regulation 
by mutual assent. 
The dangers of the AllstatelFinancial Indemnity ap- 
proach are manifold. In the first place, it forces a wealth 
transfer from those who respect the terms of their agreements 
to those who do not. . . . But these benefits do not appear as  
manna from heaven; like all other economic advantages, 
someone has to pay for them. Under these circumstances, 
insurance companies foot the bill, but only until they can 
raise their rates t o  cover the additional risk. Automobile rent- 
ers thus wind up paying for the implied permittee term 
whether they want it or not; those who respect the terms of 
their contract wind up subsidizing the renegers. As is often 
the case with judicially created rules that adjust contract 
rights on an ad hoc basis, an implied permittee term favors 
the careless, the irresponsible, the crafty, the unscrupulous a t  
the expense of those who live up to their contractual responsi- 
bilities." 
As a matter of experience, breach is a relatively common 
occurrence in the marketplace . . . . I t  is therefore "foreseeable 
and inevitable," t o  quote Allstate, that a significant portion of 
all contracts will be violated. Applying the rationale of 
Allstate and Financial Indemnity, one would have to conclude 
that virtually all commercial agreements are unenforceable 
because the contracting parties will be deemed to have con- 
80. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, 901 F.2d 765, 766 (9th 
Cir. 1990). 
81. Id. at 768 (citations omitted). 
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sented to every "foreseeable and inevitable" breach. 
This is total nonsense, of course; no court would take the 
reasoning of these cases to its logical conclusion. Yet there is 
nothing in principle that distinguishes Allstate and Financial 
Indemnity from the examples we have given; i t  all turns on 
the gut feeling of the judge who happens to be applying the 
law. Cases like Allstate and Financial Indemnity are particu- 
larly pernicious, therefore, because they give courts a roving 
commission to nullify or rewrite contract terms they don't 
like, and to do so without bothering to rely on established 
principles of contract law.82 
Insurance companies and other institutional litigants are 
frequently heard to complain that courts undermine commer- 
cial transactions by refusing to apply contract terms as the 
parties agreed to them. As often as  not, however, courts adopt 
these positions a t  the urging of these very litigants, who, for 
one reason or other, find i t  in their short-run interest to press 
such arguments." 
This case provides a textbook example of how equitable doc- 
trines, developed by the courts in an effort to avoid fraud and 
oppression, can be manipulated to achieve fraud and oppres- 
sion. In allowing the parties to undermine the finality of a 
facially unconditional transfer in Kawauchi, the Hawaii Su- 
preme Court no doubt hoped to achieve a fairer result, consis- 
tent with the widespread notion that justice will be served if 
only parties are allowed to explain their undocumented inten- 
tions and reservations. 
What the court might have overlooked, however, is the 
unfairness that can flow from the necessity of litigating a 
claim such as Ellis's. When parties are allowed to undermine 
the finality of written instruments, every transaction can be 
held hostage to competing claims as to what might have been 
said or believed by any of the participants. Moreover, disre- 
garding the plain language of a deed or contract may, as in 
this case, enable a party to enter the transaction with the 
intent "to ensnare, entrap, and defraud." In any event, litigat- 
ing such claims, no matter how legitimate, is expensive, time- 
consuming and nerve-racking. 
82. Id. at 769. 
83. Id. at 771. 
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While holding parties to the words of their written in- 
struments may result in an occasional unfairness, it certainly 
avoids the type of delay, unfairness and expense generated in 
this case. SufEce to say that, but for the Kawauchi rule, this 
case would have been over in 1982, or sooner. On balance, we 
believe that the far wiser, as well as fairer, rule is one which 
puts parties on notice that they will be bound by the terms of 
the instruments they sign?4 
The right to enter into contracts-to adjust one's legal rela- 
t ionships by mutua l  agreement  wi th  o ther  free 
individuals-was unknown through much of history and is 
unknown even today in many parts of the world. Like other 
aspects of personal autonomy, it is too easily smothered by 
government officials eager to tell us what's best for us. The 
recent tendency of judges to insinuate tort causes of action 
into relationships traditionally governed by contract is just 
such overreaching. It  must be viewed with no less suspicion 
because the government officials in question happen to wear 
robed5 
Pacific Gas casts a long shadow of uncertainty over all trans- 
actions negotiated and executed under the law of California. 
As this case illustrates, even when the transaction is very 
sizeable, even if it involves only sophisticated parties, even if 
it was negotiated with the aid of counsel, even if i t  results in 
contract language that is devoid of ambiguity, costly and 
protracted litigation cannot be avoided if one party has a 
strong enough motive for challenging the contract. While this 
rule creates much business for lawyers and an occasional 
windfall to some clients, it leads only to frustration and delay 
for most litigants and clogs already overburdened 'courts. 
It  also chips away a t  the foundation of our legal system. 
By giving credence to the idea that words are inadequate t o  
express concepts, Pacific Gas undermines the basic principle 
that language provides a meaningful constraint on public and 
private conduct. If we are unwilling to say that parties, deal- 
84. In re Corey, 892 F.2d 829, 838 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989). 
85. Oki America, Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring). 
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ing face to face, can come up with language that binds them, 
how can we send anyone to jail for violating statutes consist- 
ing of mere words lacking "absolute and constant referents"? 
How can courts ever enforce decrees, not written in language 
understandable to all, but encoded in a dialect reflecting only 
the 'linguistic background of the judge"? Can lower courts 
ever be faulted for failing to carry out the mandate of higher 
courts when "perfect verbal expression" is impossible? Are all 
attempts to develop the law in a reasoned and principled 
fashion doomed to failure as "remnant[sl of a primitive faith 
in the inherent potency and inherent meaning of words"? 
Be that as i t  may. While we have our doubts about the 
wisdom of Pacific Gas, we have no difficulty understanding 
its meaning, even without extrinsic evidence to guide us. As 
we read the rule in California, we must reverse and remand 
to the district court in order to give plaintiff an opportunity to 
present extrinsic evidence as to the intention of the parties in 
drafting the contract. It  may not be a wise rule we are apply- 
ing, but it is a rule that binds 
Written instruments, fixing the parties' rights and respon- 
sibilities by mutual consent, bring an important measure of 
order to life and greatly facilitate the adjudicatory process. 
While interpreting contract language is not always easy, 
sticking to  the words the parties actually used limits substan- 
tially the bounds of legitimate di~agreernent.~' 
But it is exceedingly difficult to know what parties really 
thought many years back and virtually impossible to divine 
what they would have thought had they but known some- 
thing they did not." 
At root, this case is about the respect the law ought to accord 
agreements between private parties. Despite recent cynicism, 
sanctity of contract remains an important civilizing concept. 
. . . It  embodies some very important ideas about the nature 
of human existence and about personal rights and responsibil- 
ities: that people have the right, within the scope of what is 
86. Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569-70 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (footnotes omitted). 
87. Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1459 (9th Cir. 1988). 
88. Id. at 1460. 
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lawful, to fix their legal relationships by private agreement; 
that the future is inherently unknowable and that individuals 
have different visions of what it may bring; that people find i t  
useful to resolve uncertainty by "mak[ingl their own agree- 
ment and thus designat[ing] the extent of the peace being 
purchased," that courts will respect the agreements people 
reach and resolve disputes thereunder according to objective 
principles that do not favor one class of litigant over another; 
and that enforcement of these agreements will not be held 
hostage to delay, uncertainty, the cost of litigation or the 
generosity of juries.89 
Parties can never be sure about what the future will bring; 
they sign contracts for the very purpose of guarding against 
unforeseen contingencie~.~~ 
G. Statutory Interpretation 
Judge Kozinski also advocates the plain-meaning approach to  
statutory interpretation: 
What the majority has done here does comport with a type of 
rough-and-ready frontier justice and may not seem terribly 
significant. But the implications of the decision are quite 
prof~und.~'  
When courts take i t  upon themselves to improve upon statu- 
tory language, they often buy themselves a lot of trouble that 
may not be immediately obvious . . ., . I predict that [this deci- 
sion] will quietly breed its own jurisprudence, calling upon us 
to determine what'kinds of circumstances are ?highly unusu- 
al" enough to emancipate us from statutory strictures. For the 
benefit of the members of the bar who might try and guess 
how I will exercise this discretion, let the record reflect that I 
wear a 9% wide? 
* * * * 
89. Id. (citations omitted). 
90. Id. 
91. United States v. Ray, 920 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dis- 
senting). 
92. Id. at 569. 
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As a linguistic matter, "and" and "or" are not synonyms; in- 
deed, they are more nearly antonyms. One need only start the 
day with a breakfast of ham or eggs to be duly impressed by 
the differen~e.'~ 
[Wlhen we allow ourselves to be guided by intuition that 
Congress didn't really mean what i t  said, we are no longer in- 
terpreting laws, we are making them.g4 
But this is not reliance on legislative history a s  I understand 
the term; it is clairvoyance. If we are fiee to make up the law 
based on our guess as  to what Congress may have thought 
about a case i t  never thought of, we might a s  well dispense 
with statutes altogether and rely on ouija boards instead." 
The two provisions have about as much in common as  apples 
and pineapples: They sound vaguely similar but they grow on 
entirely different statutory trees.g6 
The following comments on a notoriously murky statute caught 
the attention of C o n g r e ~ s : ~ ~  
No one who has had occasion to study the Limitation of Lia- 
bility Act has been struck by its lucidity.98 
Drafted with the same meticulousness a s  the original statute, 
the 1936 amendment failed to address the question presented 
to us today . . . ." 
93. MacDonald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 859 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 
1988) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
94. United States v. Phelps, 895 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
95. Id. at  1284. 
96. Cubanski v. Heckler 794 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., dis- 
senting from denial of rehearing en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. Bowen v. 
Kizer, 485 U.S. 386 (1988). 
97. See S. REP. NO. 94, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989). 
98. Esta Later Charters, Inc. v. Ignacio, 875 F.2d 234, 235-36 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(footnote omitted). 
99. Id. at 237. 
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As noted, the Limitation of Liability A d  is unlikely to serve 
as  a model of legislative draftsmanship. Because the question 
presented to us seems not to have been contemplated by the 
legislative drafters, we are now asked to distill more from the 
statute than Congress put into it."' 
Misshapen from the start, the subject of later incrustations, 
arthritic with age, the Limitation Act has "provided the set- 
ting for judicial lawmaking seldom eq~alled."'~' 
H. Voting Rights 
Protecting incumbency and safeguarding the voting rights of 
minorities are purposes often a t  war with each other. Ethnic 
and racial communities are natural breeding grounds for 
political challengers; incumbents greet the emergence of such 
power bases in their districts with all the hospitality corpo- 
rate managers show hostile takeover bids.'02 
The only other way to explain the result in Burns is to as- 
sume that there is no principle a t  all a t  play here, that one 
person one vote is really nothing more than a judicial squint- 
ing of the eye, a rough-and-ready determination whether the 
apportionment scheme complies with some standard of pro- 
portionality the reviewing court happens to find acceptable. I 
am reluctant to ascribe such fluidity to a constitutional prin- 
ciple that the Supreme Court has told us embodies "funda- 
mental ideas of democratic go~ernment."''~ 
I. Criminal Law and Procedure 
Concluding that extracting blood from a drunk driving suspect 
violated the Fourth Amendment: 
Surely, however, drunk driving is as serious a problem as  
many crimes that are labeled felonies, e.g., stealing $400 of 
possessions from a corpse; impersonating a bride or bride- 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 239. 
102. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozin- 
ski, J., con&rring in part and dissenting in part). 
103. Id. at 784 (footnote & citation omitted). 
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groom; or selling 1/10 of an ounce of marijuana.lo4 
Cal.Pen.Code 8 642 (West 1988) makes it a felony to commit 
grand theft from a dead person; under Cal.Pen.Code 8 487 
(West Supp. 1991), grand theft is the theft of possessions 
worth more than $400. If those possessions happen to be 
avocados or crustaceans, $100 worth will do; and if it's one of 
the listed farm animals, its value is immaterial. I t  follows 
that the nonconsensual removal of a goat from a corpse would 
be a felony in California.lo5 
But I just can't imagine a case where the police need to ad- 
minister a blood test in self-defense.lo6 
That issue is governed by the Constitution, not the California 
Vehicle Code. We should not confuse one for the other.lo7 
There's a simple way for the police to avoid many complex 
search and seizure problems: Get a search warrant.lo8 
Criticizing Ninth Circuit rulings interpreting the Sentencing 
Guidelines' downward departure for "acceptance of 
responsibility": 
This requirement puts defendants like Aichele in a really 
tight box. . . . 
. . . If a defendant like Aichele wants to be eligible for 
the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, he 
must break his silence and tell the judge all about how he 
done the dirty deed and how sorry he is about it. 
. . . [Tlhe prosecution would be entitled to retry the defen- 
dant, using as evidence his heart-felt confession and words of 
contrition. 
. . . .  
A defendant is thus put to a brutal choice between ob- 
104. Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 853 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
105. Id. at 853 n.3 (citation omitted). 
106. Id. at 853. 
107. Id. at 854 n.6. 
108. United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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taining a shorter sentence and giving up his right to appeal, 
and preserving intact his right to appeal but giving up the 
opportunity to plead for a more lenient sentence. I realize 
that criminal trials are not for the faint of heart and that 
criminal defendants often must choose among unpalatable 
alternatives but this, it seems to me, goes too far.log 
Presumably a defendant could try to obtain an acquittal by 
protesting his innocence and then later come clean and bow 
and scrape before the district judge in seeking a reduced 
sentence. It  would be tough but, one might maintain, it would 
not be impossible. The limit of this logic too seems to be 
reached where it becomes impossible to obtain the sentence 
reduction and preserve the right to an effective appeal.'1° 
I agree with my colleagues that we cannot simply give defen- 
dant the benefit of the two-level reduction without requiring 
that he subject himself to the self-flagellatory ritual contem- 
plated by the Guidelines; even then the district judge would 
have to exercise his discretion whether or not to grant the 
reduction. All of this, of course, is beyond our competence."' 
In a case involving a prosecutor, Carter, who testified for the 
government: 
Carter stopped just short of pinning a Boy Scout Merit Badge 
on Silverman [a key government ~ i tness] . "~  
Cases like this one put defense lawyers in a real dilemma: 
How far can you go toward impeaching the prosecution's wit- 
ness before you find yourself Carterized, as happened here? If 
normal impeachment of a prosecution witness-which some- 
times involves suggestions that the witness might be 
fibbing-gives an excuse for putting the prosecutor on the 
stand to tell just how upright the witness really is, criminal 
trials will be reduced to a credibility contest between the 
109. United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting in part). 
110. Id. at 769. 
111. Id. at 770. 
112. United States v. K e ~ e y ,  911 F.2d 315, 323 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
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prosecutor and the defendant.l13 
Here, the prosecutor should have refrained from offering 
himself as a witness; failing that, the district court should 
have rejected his testimony; failing that, the district court 
should have limited his testimony to direct rebuttal of mat- 
ters raised by the defense; failing that this court should re- 
verse Kenney's conviction. I fear that all of these successive 
failings have denied Kenney a fair trial. I must dissent.l14 
In a case in which the defendant, Phelps, traded a gun for 
drugs, the majority held that the offense did not involve the 
use of a firearm. Judge Kozinski disagreed: 
Mark Phelps was a man with a problem: He was in the 
business of manufacturing illegal drugs, but he just couldn't 
get his hands on a commercial quantity of Ephedrine, a re- 
stricted precursor of metham~hetamine."~ 
Phelp's dog-and-pony show was a hit; the men were fascinat- 
ed by the gun. But when they asked Phelps how much he 
wanted for it, he told them it wasn't for sale-unless they 
agreed to supply Ephedrine, in which case he would give 
them the machine gun and silencer for fiee.l16 
The panel's refbsal to apply the statute to a fact situation 
squarely covered by the clear statutory language, and the full 
court's failure to correct the error, raise a b d a m e n t a l  ques- 
tion: Is there any law that the courts cannot circumvent 
through creative "interpretation"? The answer apparently is 
no. If the phrase "during and in relation to any.  . . drug 
trafficking crime" can be construed as  excluding the situation 
where a drug manufacturer brings an automatic weapon and 
ammunition to a place where a drug deal is going down, of- 
fers to load the gun and shoot it, and the gun serves as the 
bait that makes the deal click, it is difficult to imagine any 
statutory language that a court cannot construe out of exis- 
tence, based simply on its own gut feeling that this is not 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. United States v. Phelps, 895 F.2d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
116. Id. 
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what Congress had in mind."7 
The MAC 10, suddenly transmogrified into an offensive weap- 
on, was still in his possession; Phelps opened fire and shot a 
deputy sheriff.. . . While the shooting of the deputy sheriff 
forms the basis of a separate state conviction and was consid- 
ered here only during sentencing, i t  demonstrates as vividly 
as anything can that drug dealers are in a constant state of 
war with civilized society, making them extremely dangerous 
when armed.'l8 
For a close-up look a t  the MAC 10 in action, see Betrayed 
(United Artists 1988), widely available on video~assette."~ 
If resort to legislative history is appropriate a t  all under these 
circumstances, it is this over-riding reality that should guide 
us-not a stray comment in a footnote of an irrelevant com- 
mittee report, a comment that has nothing a t  all to do with 
this case.l2' 
By reversing Phelp[s'l section 924(c) conviction on this record, 
the panel cuts a large hole deep into the heart of the stat- 
ute. . . . Under this dangerous new theory, hardened crimi- 
nals like Phelps can run a drug manufacturing plant and an 
armory on the same premises and escape punishment under 9 
924(c) by claiming that the guns were merely stock-in- 
trade.121 
This case involved a government informant named Miller: 
Miller was a prostitute, heroin user and fugitive from Cana- 
dian justice; but otherwise she was okay.ln 
Throughout the investigation, Miller engaged in pastimes 
unbecoming someone on the federal payroll: prostitution, 
heroin use and 
117. Id. at 1283. 
118. Id. at 1288 n.4. 
119. Id. at 1285 n.1. 
120. Id. at 1286. 
121. Id. at 1290. 
122. United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 1991). 
123. Id. 
It turns out that Adrian was not only a drug-dealer, but also 
a messy housekeeper.lz4 
David and Adrian were arrested and placed in a police car. 
Unbeknownst to them, the police activated a tape recorder in 
the car's trunk. While David and Adrian kept themselves 
busy discussing their circumstances and making incriminat- 
ing statements, the police obtained a warrant to remove and 
open the safe.lz5 
Liberty-the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by 
government--is as  easily lost through insistent nibbles by 
government officials who seek to do their jobs well as by those 
whose purpose it is oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as 
the shark. lz6 
To be sure, from the point of view of law enforcement authori- 
ties, such a procedure may have disadvantages. But the same 
can be said of the Bill of Rights.lz7 
The dissent is in the awkward position of maintaining that 
the sixth amendment makes a distinction which is invidious 
under the standards of the fifth.lz8 
J. RICO 
If Berkeley, California, was the last bastion of sixties coun- 
terculture, Bamngton Hall, the city's oldest and largest stu- 
dent housing co-operative, was surely the last rampart. While 
124. United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 1991). 
125. Id. at 896. 
126. United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency (Campbell), 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 
(9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). 
127. United States v. Nates, 831 F.2d 860, 867 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
128. United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1206 n.10 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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much of Berkeley became stuffy and conventional, the resi- 
dents of Barrington Hall clung to their freewheeling ways. A 
bit too freewheeling, according to two of Barrington's neigh- 
bors. They claim that the co-op's denizens engaged in massive 
drug-law violations, turning the neighborhood into a drug- 
enterprise zone. This, they allege, interfered with the use and 
enjoyment of their property. We consider whether they state a 
claim under RICO, 18 U.S.C. 88 1961-196~. '~~ 
Barrington Hall's reputation was larger than life, even by 
California standards. Known across the country as  a "drug 
den and anarchist household," Barrington Hall prided itself 
on fostering alternative lifestyles. Its bizarre and irreverent 
rituals included nude dinners with themes like Satan's Vil- 
lage Wine Dinner and the Cannibal Wine Dinner-the latter 
complete with body-part shaped food. "It was hard on us vege- 
tarians," sniffed one former resident.lgO 
These bacchanalian festivals often turned riotous. Objects, 
ranging from bottles to clothes dryers, were thrown out of the 
building into the yards and homes of neighbors. And in keep- 
ing with the counterculture motif, drug use and distribution 
were common: Plaintiffs allege that no fewer than 19 different 
enterprises and individuals-with colofil names like "Mush- 
room Dave," "Icepick Al," "Onngh Yanngh," and "Marybeth 
(a.k.a. ScarymethY-used Barrington Hall as  a base for deal- 
ing drugs such as LSD, heroin and methamphetamine. 
Even as Berkeley gentrified and grew more conservative, 
Barrington Hall remained "a place where revolutionary ex- 
pression was encouraged and often taken to the extreme." 
Barrington Hall was, according to the graffiti on its walls, 
"An Oasis of Madness in a World Gone Sane." 
The neighbors were not amused. They blame Barrington 
Hall for all sorts of social problems, including crime and lit- 
ter. They also claim that the co-op's residents conducted drug 
deals and posted look-outs in front of plaintiffs' apartments, 
bothering them and making i t  look like they, too, were deal- 
ing drugs; and that Barrington's residents, to avoid publicity 
and conceal their illegal activity, regularly dumped the bodies 
of persons suffering drug overdoses onto the sidewalks near 
neighboring apartments. 
129. Oscar v. University Students Co-op Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(footnote omitted), reh'g en barn granted, 952 F.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1992). 
130. Id. at 809-10 (citations omitted). 
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Two neighbors, plaintiffs Ruth Oscar and Charles 
Spinosa, filed this suit, charging that the drug-dealing consti- 
tuted a racketeering enterprise which injured their property. 
They asked for triple damages under RICO plus recovery on 
an assortment of pendent state claims. Barrington Hall itself 
has since gone the way of love-ins and strawberry wine . . . . 
But this suit remains, proving once again that there is strife 
after death.13' 
Plaintiffs blame the occupants of Barrington Hall for a multi- 
tude of misdeeds, from assault to vandalism; their complaint 
reads more like an enumeration of the ten plagues than a 
pleading in federal court.'" 
Plaintiffs' injury is conceptually no different than if a portion 
of their apartments had been flooded or damaged by fire. It 
would be possible, in either of these cases, to characterize the 
injury a s  merely psychic. The lessees are still entitled to live 
there; they just won't enjoy it  as  much. Indeed just about any 
injury to property (except theft of the property itself) could be 
characterized the same way: You still own the pile of scrap 
metal lying by the side of the freeway, but you won't derive 
the same pleasure from i t  as  when i t  was a brand-new 
Maserati. 133 
Thus, RICO entitles the owner of the Maserati to recover 
triple the value of the ruined car; but i t  gives him nothing for 
the pain and suffering of having watched his dream machine 
reduced to a heap of r ~ b b 1 e . l ~ ~  
K. Civil Procedure 
Yes, we are indeed holding that the Department has waived 
its right to argue that CEMS waived its right to ask for a 
waiver of repayment.135 
131. Id. at 810 (citations omitted). 
132. Id. at 813. "Apparently plaintiffs were unable to come up with any injuries 
or crimes that begin with the letters w, x, y, and z." Id. at n.6. 
133. Id. at 812. 
134. Id. 
135. Chicano Educ. and Manpower Serv. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 909 
F.2d 1320, 1328 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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This case is dead, procedurally as well as substantively. By 
breathing new life into it, my colleagues create much business 
for the lawyers but ill-serve the interests of the parties and 
the cause of sound judicial administration.ls6 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are clear as mountain 
spring water . . . .I3' 
That issue is governed by Rule 8(a)(3), which has a much 
lower number because i t  comes into play long before Rule 
54(c). ls8 
If Rule 54(c) automatically cures any and all failures to state 
a prayer, Rule 8(a)(3) becomes nothing more than friendly 
advice. ls9 
My colleagues leap over two hurdles with a single bound by 
also ignoring the rule that claims may not be raised for the 
first time on appeal.'" 
If Z Channel, a well-heeled litigant represented by one of the 
giants of the antitrust bar, is not bound by its litigation choic- 
es, who is?14' 
The majority engages in judicial necromancy yet again when 
it resurrects a substantive theory Z Channel long ago let 
expire, bringing this case back from the dead not once but 
Once in a while big, interesting, difficult cases implode, leav- 
ing nothing for us to decide. When this happens, we should 
sweep aside the rubble, not compress it until i t  turns into a 
judicial black hole that sucks up productive resources of cos- 
mic proportions. . . . This case is dead. R.I.P.143 
136. Z Channel Ltd. Partnership v. Home Box Ofice, Inc., 931 F.2d 1338, 1345 





141. Id. at 1346. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 1349. 
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I t  is our responsibility to answer the question fairly presented 
to us by the litigants, not one we might prefer they had 
asked. Because the majority comes up with the right answer 
to the wrong question, I must dissent."" 
The majority's attempt to find safety between the pendulum 
of preemption and the pit of unlawful discrimination is simply 
~navai1ing.l"~ 
Dissenting from an order certifying a question to a state su- 
preme court: 
The "better policy" in such circumstances is for the Arizona 
Supreme Court to just say 
At the heart of the court's analysis is the notion that to allow 
White to relitigate his case before a jury would work an injus- 
tice. I am not convinced; as I see it, the injustice lies in the 
court's decision today, a decision that denies plaintiff the 
benefit of a precedent he was entitled to rely on. Palmer, 
decided nine years ago, established the law of the circuit long 
before this case was filed. White, acting pro se, discharged 
fully his responsibility under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- 
dure and the law of this circuit in securing his right to a jury. 
Defendant, a t  all times represented by counsel, was on notice 
of plaintiffs request for a jury trial; elementary research 
would have disclosed that White's seventh amendment right 
was not waivable by acquiescence or mute assent. Defendant, 
no less than plaintiff, could have brought this to the attention 
of the district court and objected to the conduct of a bench 
trial. He did not. While I assume this was the result of inad- 
vertence rather than calculation, it is nonetheless hard to 
conclude-as the majority and concurrence do--that the fault 
was entirely plaintiffs and that he should therefore pay for 
the district court's error by forfeiting his constitutional right 
144. Livadas v. Aubry, 943 F.2d 1140, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
145. Id. at 1149. 
146. Carroll v. United States, 923 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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to trial by jury.14' 
Most likely, what we have here is an oversight by all con- 
cerned. The question is, who should pay for this mutual mis- 
take? I have much difficulty concluding it should be the party 
who did exactly what the law required of him.'" 
L. Administrative Law 
But words on paper do not become legislative regulations 
merely because the Secretary could have promulgated them 
as such; he must actually have done so. The Secretary, how- 
ever, denies doing any such thing, and all available evidence 
supports his ~ 1 a i m . l ~ ~  
I had thought it firmly established that a court may not roam 
through the vast libraries of federal agency publications, 
borrowing from those it likes and ignoring the rest.''' 
Lawyers in the nine western states will now have a field day 
prospecting for other such nuggets within the thousands of 
pages of internal instructions issued by agencies regulating 
vast areas of the law: tax, personnel, transportation, agricul- 
ture, the environment, to name a few. 
Having created uncertainty where stability is vital, the 
panel's methodology will breed litigation which will then 
beget further uncertainty. While this may be a bonanza for 
lawyers, and give immense power to courts to meddle in the 
affairs of the Executive Branch, it will cause no end of head- 
aches for agency officials who will now have to guess which of  
their informal, unsigned, internal guidelines will be found 
"exceptional" enough to outrank regulations. That door, i t  
seems to me, was slammed shut by the Supreme Court in 
cases such as Schweiker v. Hansen and Federal Crop Insur- 
ance u. Merrill. It should remain that way.''' 
147. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 706-7 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting). 
148. Id. at 707 n.2. 
149. Cubanski v. Heckler, 794 F.2d 540, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. Bowen 
v. Kizer, 485 U.S. 386 (1988). 
150. Id. at 544. 
151. Id. 
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In order t o  find fault with the Secretary's action, the panel 
tells the Secretary that he acted with motives he denies hav- 
ing and pursuant to statutory powers he denies exercising. 
Such psychoanalysis of administrative decision-making far 
exceeds the bounds of judicial review.ls2 
"[Elxcess Pain" is a concept only a lawyer could love: vague, 
statutorily unsupported, metaphysically incongruo~s. '~~ 
Pain, however, like beauty, is entirely subjective; i t  is impos- 
sible to compare one person's suffering with that of another, 
much less determine the "correcty' amount of pain someone 
should feel because of a particular impairment.ls4 
The next worst thing to having no insurance a t  all is having 
two insurance companies cover the same claim. In the ab- 
sence of consistent coordination of coverage provisions, the 
two companies can dissipate months, even years, wrangling 
with one another, while the insured and the provider of the 
covered services are left holding the bag.ls5 
M. Antitrust Law 
By finding that Syufy did not possess the power to set prices 
or to exclude competition, the district court removed the firing 
pins from the government's litigation arsenal. Without these 
essential elements, i t  can make out a violation of neither the 
Sherman nor Clayton Acts; its lawsuit collapses like a house 
of cards. ls6 
I t  is a tribute to the state of competition in America that the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has found no 
worthier target than this paper tiger on which to expend 
152. Id. at 545. 
153. B u ~ e l l  v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring in judgment). 
154. Id. at 352 (citation omitted). 
155. PM Group Life Insurance Co., v. Western Growers Assurance Trust, 953 
F.2d 543, 544 (9th Cir. 1992). 
156. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 671 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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limited taxpayer resour~es . '~~  
N. Employment Law 
Working on an oil rig is dangerous business. I t  requires total 
concentration, precise timing, a fair degree of coordination 
and a significant amount of speed. Rig accidents can have 
disastrous consequences, ranging from severed limbs and 
multiple deaths to massive despoliation of the environment. It  
goes without saying that drug abuse has no place on oil rigs 
and that a company operating oil rigs has the righGindeed, 
the obligation-to take decisive action when it obtains reliable 
information that some of its employees may be abusing drugs 
while on duty. 
This is the unhappy tale of a company that did just that. 
Company officials reasonably believed that three employees 
had used drugs on the job, not once but repeatedly. Two eye- 
witnesses fingered the drug-using employees; the company 
pursued the matter promptly, but not precipitously, obtaining 
confirmation from yet a third eyewitness before discharging 
the violators. The personnel action was taken in a balanced, 
detached, professional manner, free from any hint of rancor or 
personal animosity. Had the company acted less decisively, i t  
would have betrayed its responsibility to other employees and 
the environment we all share. Yet when all is said and done, 
the fingered employees walk off with a cool third of a million 
dollars, while the company is left to pick up the tab, pay its 
lawyers and scratch its head wondering what it could have 
done differently. It  is a question we all might ponder as we 
contemplate the bitter lesson of this cockeyed morality 
In my view, the interest of everyone involved would have 
been better served had this dispute arisen in the context of a 
collective bargaining agreement, which would have provided 
an effective mechanism for dealing with the issues presented. 
I fear, however, that decisions such as  these ill-serve the 
cause of voluntary unionization, shifting to the courts an 
increasing number of labor disputes that have traditionally 
been handled by union-sponsored grievance procedures. While 
157. Id. at 672 (footnote omitted). 
158. Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 204 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting). 
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it is difficult to judge such matters, I suspect that a signifi- 
cant cause of the recent trend away from union membership 
may be the availability of judicial remedies that give employ- 
ees the same-and sometimes superior-rights as those avail- 
able under a collective bargaining agreement.15g 
Plaintiffs in our case, by contrast, were engaged in work so 
dangerous that a single slip could easily kill a co-worker or 
unleash an environmental catastrophe. In spite of this, Park- 
er Drilling obtained no fewer that three eyewitnesses reports 
that plaintiffs were using drugs on the job before firing them. 
To wait any longer or look any closer would have been reck- 
less; the dangers being what they weye, the company had no 
responsible choice but to act decisively. By affirming the jury 
verdict against Parker, we are saying that management erred 
grievously by failing to send the employees back onto the oil 
rig after receiving three eyewitness reports that they were 
observed regularly abusing drugs on the job, and that the 
company must now pay hundreds of thousands of dollars for 
its mistake. 
This strikes me as a result so preposterous i t  would be 
laughable if i t  were not so scary. Is this the type of decision 
we want to take out of the hands of management and give to 
a jury? Is it fair (or safe) to put company officials to a choice 
between risking environmental catastrophe and a crushing 
jury verdict? I t  seems to me that the most we can reasonably 
ask of managers under these difficult circumstances is that 
they act responsibly and in good faith.l6' 
Call it common law or common sense, if there is a judicially 
created rule that allows juries to second guess all employee 
terminations, there ought to be a judicially created exception 
for situations where the employer moves quickly and in good 
faith to ensure the safety of its employees.161 
If today's morality tale teache'S anything, i t  is the wisdom of 
the aphorism: nice guys finish last. For its trouble, Parker 
Drilling is rewarded with a bill for $360,107, years of litiga- 
tion and a truckload of attorney time sheets. The moral of 
this story will not be lost on other, similarly situated, employ- 
ers. 
159. Id. at 212 all. 
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KOZINSKI'S GREATEST HITS 
Ideas have consequences and the ideas embodied in judi- 
cial opinions have very direct and immediate consequences. . . 
. The clear lesson of this case is that, unless the employee is 
caught red-handed by someone with authority to fire him, he 
can always manufacture a triable issue of fact by finding a 
few co-workers who never saw him using drugs, inventing 
some threat, or whatnot. And if a jury buys into the story, the 
courts will cheerfully uphold the award, no matter how little 
sense it makes in light of the record as a whole. It  is difficult 
to say how many drug abusers will be permitted to remain on 
the job by litigation-timid managers, but there will surely be 
some. 162 
0. Miscellaneous 
All this proves is that, if you define the product market 
broadly enough, you can encompass any number of business- 
es, no matter how little they compete with each other. 
American Cab, American Airlines and American Motors all 
provide "transportation services," but no one is likely to call 
American Cab for a ride from New York to London; American 
Telephone & Telegraph and American Broadcasting Company 
both provide "mass communication services," but ABC cheer- 
fully carries AT&Ts advertising; the American Civil Liberties 
Union, the American Legion and the American College of Foot 
Surgeons are all fairly characterized as "public service organi- 
zations," yet I rather doubt the ACLU gets a lot of calls about 
podiatry. Most people know the difference between a bank 
and an insurance company; I doubt they will be confused just 
because my colleagues have come up with a term fuzzy 
enough to cover both institutions.la 
There are times when statutes, particularly those involving 
the collection of revenue, can work serious hardships. No one 
can blame government lawyers for pressing their client's 
rights under such circumstances. It  is a wholly different mat- 
ter, however, for government lawyers to ignore or bend the 
words of Congress in pursuit of an unconscionable result. To 
162. Id. at 217. 
163. American Intl Group v. American Int'l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 835-36 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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inflict the expense and uncertainty of litigation on citizens on 
such a tenuous basis is conduct unbecoming public servants 
and officers of the court. I can only hope that this matter will 
be brought to the personal attention of the Assistant Attorney 
General for the Tax Division, the United States Attorney for 
the Central District of California and the Chief Counsel of the 
Internal Revenue Service so that they may each take appro- 
priate steps to avoid such overzealousness by their subordi- 
nates in the future.164 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The evidence is in. Instead of relying on LA. Law and 
Perry Mason, we are going to get the public's opinion scientifi- 
cally. Please register your view by filling out a photocopy of the 
following form and mailing it to the BYU Law Review. 
Check All That Apply 
I would.like to see more judicial humor like Judge 
Kozinski's. Then maybe I could read a case (or law 
review article) without falling asleep. 
Humor has no place in judicial opinions. (If you 
checked this line, you should also check the next 
line). 
I am Humor Impaired. Where can I get some of 
those shorts mentioned in footnote 7? 
I illegally photocopied this Comment. I am enclos- 
ing $5. 
David A. Golden 
164. Newnham v. United States, 813 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring). 
